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In 1967 the Vera Institute of Justice established the Manhattan
Court Employment Project to divert criminal defendants, after their
arraignment on felony or misdemeanor charges, into a program of
group therapy and employment counseling. If a defendant succeeds in
the program and obtains a job, his pending criminal charges are dismissed. The goals of this innovative program are eloquently stated in
the Vera Institute's ten-year report:
The Manhattan Court Employment Project aims to stop the development of criminal careers by entering the court process after
an individual has been arrested but before he has been tried, and
giving him the kind of counseling and opportunity for starting on
a legitimate career that he needs and otherwise is not able to
obtain. The defendant is offered the possibility that the charges
against him will be dismissed, provided he is cooperative and responds to counseling and job placement within a 90-day period
granted by the court.
It is, in other words, an attempt to convert his-arrest from a losing to a winning experience-to build a bridge for the accused
between the fractured world of the street and the .orderly world
of lawfulness and responsibility. The defendant wins because he
gets a job he likes and the charges against him are dismissed...
and society wins also because an individual who may be developThe data on New York City's Court Employment Project reported in these pages have
been excerpted from a report I submitted to the N.Y.C. Human Resources Administration
in November 1973. That research was supported by the Human Resources Administration
and the Court Employment Project. Paul Herzick, Director of Research of the Court Employment Project, supervised the collection of the data used in this paper, and Ennis
Olgiati, Director of the Court Employment Project, provided administrative and moral
support to the enterprise. The views expressed in this paper are mine and are not necessarily shared by the Human Resources Administration or the Court Employment Project,
although I hope they are. My critical focus on a Vera Institute of Justice project continues
a long academic tradition of kicking only one's friends. Since its inception the Institute
has been one of the most powerful change agents in the criminal justice system, and, at
present, the Institute research staff is one of the finest in the United States.
t Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice,
University of Chicago; student of Hans Zeisel.
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ing a criminal life style has been converted into a working employee and taxpayer. Meanwhile, the criminal justice system has
been relieved of the need to maintain him in jail or prison, perhaps
regularly throughout his life.1
Measured by its community acceptance and the extent of its emulation in other cities, the Project is one of the most spectacular successes
in the history of criminal justice reform. The Court Employment Project currently is a New York City corporation with a $3,000,000 budget
and 2,500 cases a year, which means that this program diverts more
criminal defendants than many cities arrest;2 look-alike projects have
been established all over the United States.3 In October, 1973, the
United States Senate unanimously passed a bill providing for pretrial
diversion and services in the federal system, modeled largely on the
Court Employment Project; 4 a similar bill is now pending in the
House. 5
Two common research strategies, random assignment and matching
exercises, are available to test whether early diversion programs have
an impact on their participants. The most reliable method of assessing
program impact is a random assignment experiment, in which people
eligible for diversion are divided by lot into a test group that receives
services in the program and a control group that returns to the criminal justice system for normal processing." If the project has more impact than the regular criminal justice system processes on factors such
1

VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, TEN-YEAR REPORT

1961-71, at 80 (1972). The Manhattan (now New York) Court Employment Project was one
of two pilot projects funded initially by the United States Department of Labor in 1967.
Since then, the Department of Labor has funded nine other "employment diversion"
projects in other cities. For an outline of the range of current diversion strategies, see
Vorenberg & Vorenberg, Early Diversion from the Criminal Justice System: Practice in
Search of a Theory, in PRISONERS INAMERICA 151 (L. Ohlin ed. 1973).
2 See Court Employment Project, Report, Fiscal Year 1972-73.
3 It has been estimated that there are pretrial diversion projects operating in at least
thirty jurisdictions. Vera Institute of Justice, Concept Paper: Proposal for the Evaluation of
the New York Court Employment Project, Jan. 31, 1974 (unpublished manuscript on file
at The University of Chicago Law Review). Estimates of the number of projects in exist-

ence may be expected to vary widely, because there is little agreement about what
constitutes "diversion" or when a policy becomes a project. In New York City, the
diversion capital of the United States, our partial count found thirty-nine special project
programs offering either diversion or similar services to adults or juveniles, with nineteen
of these programs offering pretrial services.
4 S. 798, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (passed Oct. 4, 1973).
5 H.R. 9007, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
6 See D. GLASER, ROUTINIZING EVALUATION: GETrING FEEDBACK ON EFFECTIVENESs OF CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY PROGRAMS 55-83 (1973).
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as employment or tendency to be rearrested, this impact should appear
as a difference in employment or subsequent arrests between the test
and control groups.
Although controlled experimentation is more effective, matching
exercises are by far the most popular device for assessing the impact
of innovative treatment programs in the criminal justice system.7 With
a matching strategy, data is collected on the characteristics of persons
exposed to a new treatment; the researcher then constructs a group of
untreated individuals whose characteristics appear to match those of
persons in the treatment group. The performances of the treatment
and matched nontreatment groups are compared, and any differences
are attributed to the impact of the treatment. The matching strategy
thus attempts to duplicate the similarity of groups created by random
assignment by finding similar persons in similar positions. Unlike random assignment, matching exercises can be constructed from historical
records after a treatment group has been selected and processed. Programs that lacked an initial research design can therefore use this
approach to acquire some data about their effectiveness. Such after-thefact matching is quicker, cheaper, and vastly more dangerous than controlled experimentation."
The initial evaluation of the Manhattan Court Employment Project
was an after-the-fact matching exercise. 9 This paper is an effort to describe the effects of that strategy on the quality of the research, on our
present knowledge of the impact of diversion programs, and on the impressions held by the Project's staff and the general public regarding the
Project's goals. After describing the initial research procedures and
results, I will describe subsequent efforts to evaluate the Project's impact. If read in the spirit in which it is written, this paper is a plea for
experimentation in law reform, rather than the nitpicking of a particular project or set of research procedures.
7 An American Bar Association study group evaluated eight attempts to study the impact of pretrial diversion on subsequent criminality by participants. One study was a
simple before-and-after comparison of participant rearrests. Two studies, in Dade County
and Des Moines, were initially designed as random assignment experiments with thirtyfive subject control groups. Five of the eight studies were after-the-fact matches of the
type described in the text. See Miller, Evaluation of Research on Pretrial Diversion, Jan.
1974 (unpublished manuscript, National Pretrial Intervention Service Center, Washington,
D.C.).
8 See D. GLAsml, supra note 6, at 55-83.
9 See Manhattan Court Employment Project of the Vera Institute of Justice, Final Report November 1967-December 31, 1970, at 44 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CEP Final
Report].
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I.

THE MANHATrAN COURT EMPLOYMENT
PROJECT EVALUATION-A FIRST LOOK

To test the impact of the Manhattan Court Employment Project
(CEP) on recidivism, the Project research staff compared the rate of
rearrests over a one-year period for three sample groups:
(1) 152 subjects who entered the Project during the first two years
of Project operations and successfully completed treatment ("Project successes");
(2) 62 subjects who entered the Project during the first two years
but failed to complete treatment ("Project failures"); and
(3) a control group of 91 criminal defendants arraigned in 1967,
before the Project started, whose court records indicated that they
would have been eligible for the Project ("Project controls").

Table 1 reports the percentage of rearrests in each group during the first
year after leaving CEP (groups 1 and 2) or arraignment (group 3).10
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS REARRESTD TWELVE
MONTHS AFrR LEAVING CEP OR ARRAIGNMENT

Project Successes
16

Project Failures
31

Controls
32

(231152)

(19162)

(29191)

SouRcE: CEP Final Report

Based on these data the repbrt concluded: "Recidivism was substantially reduced for the dismissed participant group [successes] in comparison to the terminated [failures] and control groups.""
Presenting these data and a matching study from the CEP counterpart
in Washington, D.C. (Operation Crossroads), the Senate Subcommittee
on National Penitentiaries concluded that "[t]he real benefit of pretrial
diversion is the final result: The individual who has completed a program of pretrial diversion is much less likely to commit another crime
than the individual who goes through the criminal justice system in the
normal way.... In these.., projects, the likelihood of future recidivism
'12 Analyzing the differences noted in
was substantially reduced ....
Table 1, the Subcommittee further argued:
It is important to note that charges against some of those selected
for the comparison groups were dismissed for other reasons, which
10 Id. at 44-45.
11 Id. at 50.
12 S. REP. No. 93-417, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
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clearly shows that the effectiveness of pretrial diversion lies not in
the fact of dismissal, but in the intensive community-based program in which the individual participates."3
Unfortunately, a closer analysis of Table 1 casts some doubt on what
the study "clearly shows." That the Project had a positive impact on
rearrests cannot be demonstrated by a simple comparison of the record
of Project successes-with that of the matched control group. The subjects who succeed in treatment are a biased sample of all people who
entered the Project; their success in treatment indicates that this group
was, from the start, "most likely to succeed." Assuming for the moment
that the control group is a perfect duplicate of people who enter the
Project, the correct comparison is between rearrests among all Project
participants and rearrests in the control group. The data in Table 1
require some tidying up before this comparison can be made. Although
the data in Table 1 indicate a ratio of successes to failures of approximately three to one, in fact 45 percent of the participants succeeded in
the Project during the period covered by the study.14 Table 2 uses this
true figure to adjust the Table 1 data and arrive at an estimate of the
proper comparison between the treatment and matched control groups.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF REARRESTS FOR CEP
PARTICIPANTS AND MATCHED CONTROLS

Participants

Successes

16% x.45 = 7%

Failures

31% x .55 = 17%

Total

24%

Controls

32%

Although this comparison is less dramatic than that between successes
and controls, it still lends some support to the hypothesis that the Project is reducing the likelihood of rearrests of its participants. One problem with drawing that inference from Table 2-and the basic problem
for all "matched group" studies-is the possibility that the groups being compared are essentially dissimilar.
I investigated, with the aid of the CEP research staff, whether the
test and control groups in the initial study were comparable groups.
The control group was composed of "arrestees who, on the basis of
their court papers, might have been eligible to participate in the
13 Id.

14 According to Project records, 416 of the 929 Project entrants during 1968 and 1969
eventually succeeded in treatment.
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Project,"' 5 and our initial task was to determine whether the actual
project participants were selected in the same way as the controls.
We began by putting the Project in its context, the New York City
criminal justice system. In 1971 approximately 75,000 people were
arraigned for felonies and misdemeanors in Manhattan; 1.2 percent
(871) participated in CEP. The Project selects its participants from individuals who are arraigned on weekdays. Screeners review the papers
of all defendants and elect either to "write up" a defendant, if the
Project's eligibility criteria are met,16 or to reject him as a Project
prospect. Screeners then interview defendants who have been written
up and obtain an Assistant District Attorney's approval of the defendant's participation. An Assistant District Attorney then requests the
presiding judge to adjourn the case so that the defendant may participate.
To study the screening process' 7 we obtained a sample 205 consecutive docket numbers indicating weekday arraignments during October,
1971. As indicated in Figure 1, one out of five criminal defendants
FIGURE 1
RESULTS OF SCREENING PROCESS FOR 205 CONSECUTIVE WEEKDAY ARRAIGNMENTS
IN MANHATrAN DURING OCTOBER,

Arraigned

1971

///

Write-ups

V172

Entrants

0

//////

100%

19%

2%

SoURcEs: CEP and Court.Recoris.

were written up, but thirty-five of the thirty-nine who were written up
did not enter the Project.
Since the matched controls in Tables 1 and 2 are defendants who
Vs CEP Final Report, supra note 9, at 45.
16 The Project's current announced eligibility criteria are:
1) Sex, Age: males and females between the ages of 16 and 60;
2) Residence: New York City residents (except certain areas of Queens and an of

3) Employment Status: unemployed or, if employed, not earning more than $140
per week; full time students are eligible;
4) Charge: no charge for which the arrestee would actually serve a sentence followig a conviction, and no addicts or alcoholics;

5) Pending Cases: not more than one pending charge; and
6) Prior Record: not have served more than one year in a penal institution.
See CEP, The Court Employment Project (1978) (Pamphlet).

17 CEP screening procedures were tightened in 1969 but have apparently remained
fairly constant since. See CEP Final Report, supra note 9, at 46-48.
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would have passed only the "write-up" screening, the matching exercise is actually a comparison of a control group that has been screened
once with a test group that has been screened twice; that is, Table 1
compares the later records of a sample of the 19 percent who would be
eligible for write-ups with the later records of the 2 percent who actually entered CEP. To discover why so few of the people who pass
the Project's first screening became participants, we analyzed 201 consecutive write-ups from 1972, since the data from the 1971 sample were
unavailable, and Table 3 shows the reasons for excltsion, as noted by
the screeners.
TABIE 3

CEP AMONG
201 CONSECUTIVE Wrm-uvps m 1972
Drug or alcohol involvement
Defendant pleaded guilty
Defendant rejected program
Bench warrant outstanding
REASONS FOR EXCLUSION FROM

Defendant's charge dismissed
Another program
Other

20%
15%
14%
10%

8%
6%
15%

Total not entering

86%

Entered

14%
100% (201)

SOURCE: CEP Records

Table 3 shows that no matched group selected solely from records can
be considered comparable to a sample of Project participants. The
matched control group should contain more persons with alcohol or
drug problems, because, even after a record inspection to delete drug
cases, some write-ups are eliminated at the interview screening because of drug or alcohol problems; indeed, the number of write-ups
eliminated because of such problems (20 percent) is greater than the
number that ultimately enter the Project (14 percent).S The participant
18 The later arrest patterns of the participant and control groups give some indication
of the importance of screening out drug-dependent offenders and show that the Project
screened at a progressively stricter level. Among subjects admitted to the Project in the
first fourteen m6nths of operation, the rate of later drug arrests was actually higher than
that of the controls-19.4 percent to 8.8 percent. The percentage of this treatment group
that was rearrested within a year was the same as the control group, 32 percent. Those
cases admitted during the next year had a rate of later drug arrests that was one-third of
the control group (3 percent compared to 9 percent), and it is this group that produces
the favorable total recidivism comparison (18 percent versus 32 percent). The CEP report
attributes the improvement to better screening, but does not acknowledge the possibility
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group was probably more amenable to treatment than the matched
group, because a substantial number of eligible persons declined to
enter the Project; the rate of rejection of the Project is as large as the
rate of acceptance. 19
Two intermediate conclusions can be drawn at this point from our
adventures with the CEP matching exercise. First, since the comparison used dissimilar matched groups, the rearrest figures in Table 2
are not good evidence that the Project has an impact on its subjects.
Second, in evaluating the impact of any program that recruits volunteers, volunteer subjects cannot be matched with nonvolunteer controls without creating grave doubts about the assumption that the
groups would have had similar later careers but for program intervention. This second point is of general importance, since most correctional intervention experiments require voluntary subject cooperation
and most evaluation efforts of these projects involve matching. A third
point is almost too basic for reiteration: matching exercises for projects
that screen for participants must use the same type of screening to find
appropriate comparison groups. The question now is whether there
is any way that these basic lessons can be applied to provide a better
matching exercise than that reported in Table 2.

II.

SILK PURSES OUT OF Sow's EARS?ANOTHER MATCHED GROUP STUDY

There is one after-the-fact match that is less objectionable than the
exercise just reviewed. Truly comparable groups can be constructed
from those persons whose paper records appeared to make them eligible for the Project (some of whom actually entered the Project) and
those persons who were not screened for the Project but who would
have passed the paper record screening. Any differences between the
later records of Project participants and those who would have been
treated, if they had been screened, would appear in the form of smaller
differences between the two larger eligible groups. Such a comparison
is handicapped by the fact that only 14 percent of this test group is actuthat this improved screening, rather than Project impact, produced the favorable recidivism
figures. For data on rearrests, see CEP Final Report, supra note 9, at 46-48.
19 See Table 3 supra. Other diversion programs, such as Project Crossroads (Washington,
D.C.) and the Dade County, Florida, project recruit participants from more than one pool,
which would complicate the task of determining how many of those offered admission into
the program agree to enter. Project Midway (Nassau County, New York) reports that about
three-fourths of those eligible elect to enter the project; only accused felons are eligible for
this program. See Miller, supra note 7, at 52.
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ally exposed to treatment; a reduction of 30 percent in participant rearrests would appear as a 4 percent difference in rearrests between the
two larger groups. It is thus improbable, even with the best possible
matched group, that a matching comparison would yield anything more
than the most tentative indications of Project impact.
A second problem is finding a group of New York City criminal defendants not subject to CEP screening from which a group of "writeup" controls could be drawn. Since GEP does not screen on weekends,
one source of comparison write-ups is a representative sample of defendants arraigned on weekends. A second possibility is a group of
defendants processed before GEP started screening. Rearrests are used
as a measure of criminality, however, and there are dangers in comparing rearrest rates of one group at one time with another group at
another time. The rate of arrests per 100 crimes in New York City may
have changed; a lower probability of apprehension would appear as
lower reported criminality among the group benefiting from less effi20
cient law enforcement.
We therefore decided to obtain a sample of defendants who had
passed CEP's first screening and a comparison group of defendants who
were arraigned on weekends during the same months. Later arrest records were obtained for 439 weekend defendants who met CEP criteria
and 353 weekday defendants who had passed the Project's first screening.2 1 The members of the weekend group were different in several
possibly significant respects, including the fact that they were slightly
older than the weekday write-ups, 22 but they had the same distribution
20
21
22

This is one of the many problems with Table 1, supra.
Only 49 of the 353 (14 percent) entered the Project.
The age breakdown by percent for the two write-up groups is:
Age
16-17
18-20
21-29
30 and over

Weekend
14
24
39
23

Weekday
20
23
40
17

100% (439)
100% (353)
the members of the
against
filed,
charges
in
differences
There were also some percentage
two groups:
Weekend
Weekday
Charge
Assault and Weapons
Burglary
Larceny and Theft
Drugs
Other

15
16
42
5
22

25
14
30
9
22

100% (353)

100% (439)
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of prior arrests. 23 Table 4 compares the percentage of people rearrested
within one year after normal treatment time for the weekday group
(which has some members who were treated), the weekend group
(which does not), and the group used as the original control in the
Project Report.
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF DEFENDANTS REARRESTED WITHIN ONE
YEAR AFR NORMAL TREATMENT PERIOD (BY AGE)

Age

Weekday Write-ups

Weekend Write-ups

16-17
18-20
21-29
30 and over

47
41
31
15

38
40
25
17

All ages

34%

29%0

Original Controls
*

0

82%

*Not available
SOURCES: N.Y. Police Dept. Bureau of Criminal Information (weekday and weekend
write-ups); CEP Final Report, supra note 9.

The higher age-specific rate of recidivism in the group including participants casts some doubt on the claim that the project has reduced
participant rearrests.
A further step can be taken to test whether the Project reduces reddivism among its participants. The percentage of actual entrants is
greater in the younger age groups, as shown by Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE OF WRTE-UPS ENTERING CEP (By AGE)

Entered

Did Not Enter

16-17

V//2 2%7//

78%

18-20

17 %

88%"

10%

90%

80 and over V9%1-

91%,

21-29

SOURCES:

CEP and Court Records.

If the Project had an impact on rearrests, the weekday write-up age
groups with a higher percentage of participants (the younger groups)
should fare relatively better than the age groups with a lower percent23

The percentage breakdown of the two groups by prior arrests:
Arrests
Weekday
2 or more
1
None

22
18
60

100% (353)

Weekend
23
16
61

100% (439)
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age of participants when each is compared with its weekend age group
control. The two groups with the highest percentage of participants,
however, do not compare more favorably with their group controls, as
shown by Table 4. This absence of any favorable indication remains
when the comparison is of total number of arrests per 100 subjects,2
rather than subjects arrested, and when different charge categories are
25
separated out.
24 Age-specific felony and drug offense rearrests per 100 man-years (100 subjects for one
year after normal treatment period) for the weekday and weekend groups:

Age
16-17
18-20
21-29
80 and over

Weekday

Weekend

49
41
33
9

38
49
27
14

All ages
34
31
The group with the highest concentration of program participants (16-17) has the poorest
record relative to its controls, and there is no discernible overall relationship between
extent of program participation and performance relative to the weekend group.
25 The last step in this series of comparisons involves rates per 100 man-years of felony
and drug arrests for the test and control groups. In this comparison the group is divided
into five categories of present charges and four age groups.
FELONY AND DRUG ARREgrs PER 100 MAN-YEARs, WEEKDAY AND WEEKEND WarTE-ups,
MANH-ATrAN
iSAs.E 1971

Assault
and
Weapons

Burglary

Larceny
and
Theft

* Deleted because test or control group

Drugs

Misc.

Total
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These negative indications do not rule out the possibility that the
Project reduces rearrests. Each comparison made in Table 4 involves
a test group that is composed of at least 78 percent untreated subjects,
which is hardly an ideal condition. And if, for example, younger weekend defendants are less similar to their weekday matches than older
defendants are to their matches, the lack of improvement as concentration increases could conceal a positive Project impact.
We do not know whether the similarity of rearrest rates indicates
that the Project has no more impact than normal criminal justice treatment or whether it is a product of the weakness of the research design.
What is clear, however, is that the only way to find out is to initiate,
after seven years of Project operation, random assignment experiments.
III. BAmuuEs TO EXPERIMENTATION
The Project directors have stated two reasons for the failure to institute a random assignment experiment at the outset of the Project's
operation. First, "the experimental nature of the Project demanded
26
initial emphasis on effective day-to-day operations." This reasonthe press of circumstances-is a general plea in mitigation and need not
detain us long. An unfriendly critic might even paraphrase: "the program was too experimental to be an experiment." The second reason
was a belief that "denying participation for the purposes of research
violated the humanitarian tenets of the Project and the sensitivities of
the staff." 27 This problem-the ethics of denying treatment to controls
for research purposes-is more substantial and has been the subject
28
of lively debate in recent literature. We can sharpen our understanding of the issues, however, if we define the types of experiments that
might be used to evaluate diversion projects before confronting the
issue of their humanitarian implications.
The present structure of early diversion raises two important questions: what is the impact of diverting persons from prosecution for
The rate of felony and drug arrests during the period from four to fifteen months after
arraignment was 34 per 100 man-years for the test group and 31 per 100 man-years for the
control group. When the comparison is controlled for age and charge differences, the
"test" group wins eight comparisons and the "control" group wins ten. The correlation
between Project concentration (which varied in the eighteen cells from 0 to 40 percent)
and relative test group comparison is .05, again suggesting that the percentage of a test
cell that enters the Project is not related to the relative performance of the test group
when compared to the control group.
28 CEP Final Report, supra note 9,at 44.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CI. L. REv. 629, 649-53 (1966);

Zeisel, Reducing the Hazards of Human Experiments Through Modifications in Research
Design, 169 ANNALS OF N.Y. Ac.AD. OF Sci. 475 (1970).
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crime, as compared to continuing normal criminal justice processes,
and what is the effect of the services provided by such projects on the
lives of their participants? In examining the impact of treatment facilides, an important and expensive component of programs like CEP,
it is not necessary to sacrifice any major humanitarian values. An experiment could randomly assign diverted defendants into two groups, one
group would receive therapy and job counseling and the other would
receive a postponement of charges that matures into a dismissal of pending charges if the defendant is not rearrested. If either group is disadvantaged here, it is probably the test group, because they are compelled
to participate in a program that many criminal defendants find un29
appealing.
On the other hand, to test whether the impact of treatment plus diversion is different from normal prosecution, it would be necessary to
refuse diversion to a randomly selected group of defendants, either
before they agree to enter the Project" or after they have qualified as
willing entrants. 1 The Project would thus leave some defendants at
the peril of criminal prosecution for "research purposes." Without ignoring the problematic quality of such a procedure, three points will
put the issue in perspective. First, there is currently a group of defendants who are not eligible for project participation, but who are no
less deserving of consideration than any possible control group, that
is, defendants arraigned on weekends. Whether this exclusion is a
matter of convenience or a conservation of scarce resources cannot be
determined, but since the number of defendants diverted and treated
would not be affected by an experiment, the problems of denying services to controls are no greater than denying eligibility on weekends, and
the benefits of the policy of random assignment are much greater.3 2
Second, the defendants placed in the control group would not be
subject to heavy criminal sanctions. Less than one-fifth of the defendants who would have passed the Project's write-up screening are detained before trial.33 Since the defendants who are offered treatment are
29 As Table 3 shows, 14 percent of the eligible defendants in the 1972 sample rejected
Project participation.
30 One could randomly assign the defendants who pass the second screening (which
would not include inquiry into willingness to participate) to test and control groups and
then compare the records of all defendants offered admission with those who were not.
31 One can test both services and diversion by dividing eligibles into three groupsdiverted and treated, diverted and not treated, and people returned to the criminal justice
system. A proposal for this experiment has been prepared by the Vera Institute. See Vera
Institute of Justice, supra note 3.
32 See Zeisel, supra note 28.
33 In our study of weekday and weekend write-ups, 19 percent of the weekend group
were detained before trial, while only 13 percent of the weekday write-ups were detained.
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a select "best-risk" sample of this group, their pretrial detention rate
would probably be lower. In any event, vigorous release-on-recognizance
work could minimize the number of controls detained before trial.
Further, the punishments received by people eligible for diversion are
far from awesome, as can be seen by examining, in Table 5, the case
outcomes of weekend defendants who would pass the Project's first
screening.
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSITION AT SENTENCING

STAGE BY SERIOUSNESS OF OUTCOME FOR WEEKEND WnE-uPS
IN 1971 MANHATTAN SAMPLE

Jail
Probation
Fine
Conditional discharge
Unconditional discharge
Other or Unknown
Not Convicted

7
6
11
15

3
7
51
100% (439)

SotRCE: Court Records

About half of the eligible defendants in our weekend sample who remained in the criminal justice system were not convicted of any charge,
and only 13 percent were sentenced to jail or probation. Again, the defendants who passed the second screening would, as a group, be expected to fare better. In fact, the Project accepts only defendants who
would not serve a sentence if convicted,"- and no Project failures in the
sample used for Table 4 were sentenced to jail when they returned to
the system.
These data help explain the existence of the third reason why experimental control is not deeply objectionable for a CEP-style projectin Manhattan half of the defendants offered Project participation refuse.35 Withholding the offer might work some hardship on willing controls, but when the value of the Project is deemed so marginal by its
potential clientele, the humanitarian objections to experimental controls are as close to de minimis as are likely to be found in criminal
justice reforms.3 8 Moreover, it is worth noting that data about the
operations of the criminal justice system are of value in determining
the extent of possible ethical problems.
84 See note 16 supra.

S5 See Table 3 supra.
36 An uneasy compromise with random assignment appears to have occurred in the
Dade County and Des Moines projects. See note 19 supra. The principle was accepted, but
the control groups selected were so small (thirty-four and thirty-five, respectively) that the
chances of producing worthwhile knowledge were greatly diminished.
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This paper has now advanced two complementary arguments: we
cannot obtain reliable data on the impact of early diversion programs
without genuine experiments, and the ethical barriers to experimentation, at least in the New York context, are not as great as might have
been supposed. One further topic is worthy of special mention: the
consequences of matched group evaluations for the operation of earlydiversion programs. The most obvious result of nonexperimentation
is the lack of information about the impact of diversion on its clients.
In less obvious ways, however, the lack of real information and the
fool's gold of encouraging matched group studies have affected the
character of diversion programs.
Early diversion is best viewed as a multigoal process offering two
scarce commodities-nonprosecution and expensive,37 albeit coerced,
treatment services-to a small proportion of criminal defendants. The
goals of such programs include building job skills, providing job
placement, reducing recidivism, and ameliorating the harmful consequences of contact with the criminal justice system. Under these
conditions, a number of trade offs are necessarily encountered in selecting the defendants eligble for such projects and in allocating project
resources. For example, should the project divert the defendants who
will represent the lowest risk to the community or the defendants who
will benefit most from the treatment? If project treatment reduces
criminality, these two groups will not contain the same type of defendant. The lowest risk to the community is created when the group
least likely to be arrested in any event is returned to the streets. Treatment cannot greatly improve this group, if only because it does not
have far to go. In contrast, effective treatment is most efficiently directed
to the defendants who need such treatment most, because they exhibit
a higher degree of danger, even though community treatment of this
group presents greater danger of further crime. If scarce penicillin
cures both pneumonia and colds, it is allocated first to the pneumonia
cases.
Most early-diversion programs, however, have turned their attention
to curing colds. The use of crude matching controls, or no controls at
all, reduces the ability of diversion projects to show the effect of their
programs, and puts pressure on them to "look good" in the only way
they can-by reducing rearrests in the treated group to the bare minimum. Elaborate screening tends to produce "best risk" cases. Diversion
37 The present cost per case of the Court Employment Project is approximately $1000,

with the bulk of the money being spent for treatment facilities and staff. For specific data
on costs and personnel, see CEP Final Report, supra note 9, at 50-54.
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projects across the country proclaim in-program rearrest rates as low
as 2 percent.38 Studies of subjects one year after treatment report rearrest percentages that vary but cluster around 20 percent.3 9
In the same way that the absence of controlled comparison puts pressure on programs to select good risks, rigorous random assignment liberates treatment programs by providing a new basis of measuring treatment effects-the performance of controls. With random assignment,
pressure to minimize the community risk generated by experimental
treatment will still exist, but the most dramatic evidence of treatment
impact will be produced by using higher-risk groups-cutting recidivism in half is more important if that reduction is from 60 percent to
30 percent than if it is from 20 percent to 10 percent. A low risk policy
is not necessarily wrong. If the treatment has no appreciable impact,
the low-risk approach is superior. It is only if the programs are as effective as these matching studies suggest that a low-risk selection policy
is inappropriate.
A second trade off inherent in the nature of early diversion is between the number of cases that can be diverted and the quantity of
service and supervision available for each subject. With scarce resources, much service can be provided to few defendants or less service
to a greater number of defendants. To the extent that, in the words
of the Senate Subcommittee, "the effectiveness of pretrial diversion
lies ...

40
in the intensive community-based program," the best course

is to concentrate services among a small group of recipients. To the
extent that diversion rather than the services influences the later career
of participants, a program that diverts more defendants or reduces program cost is more desirable. The matched group studies have tended
to emphasize delivery of services to defendants and have created the
"service" emphasis of the current federal proposals. It is not necessarily
wrong to concentrate services on a relatively small group of recipients,
as long as the treatment program reduces rearrests or has other worthDade County Pretrial Intervention Project, Eighteen Month Report (1973). The
same report shows a 0 percent rearrest rate for so-called Group III successes, which indicates either that the treatment is a superb success or that this group does not require
intensive supervision and treatment, In a noncontrolled evaluation, the best apparent
outcome will be achieved by treating a zero-risk group. Other in-treatment recidivism
figures are: Crossroads (Washington, D.C.), 8.5 percent; Midway (Nassau County), 3 percent; and De Novo (Des Moines), 11.7 percent. See Miller, supra note 7, at 49,51, 53, 54.
39 Miller presents the following one-year-after data: Des Moines, 20 percent (felony
convictions); Crossroads, 21 percent; Mental Health Diversion (Washington, D.C.), 12
percent. Miller, supra note 7, at 49, 51, 53, 54. Two other projects-Nassau County and
Dade County-report much lower figures, but the exposure time on which they are based
is not known. See id. at 49, 55.
40 S.RE,. No. 93-417, supra note 12.
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while impact on the lives of the treated group. But it is particularly
ironic that the crude evaluation efforts create pressures towards using
low-risk groups at the same time that they argue for high-intensity service programs to a small number of defendants. Either the wrong group
is receiving the right services (if treatment reduces recidivism) or the
right group is receiving the wrong treatment (if the major emphasis
should be on diversion rather than services).
Other issues of resource allocation have been affected by the early
efforts to evaluate diversion. Programs like CEP began with a heavy
emphasis on recruiting unemployed individuals and finding them jobs.
Recently, more participants have had jobs when they enter the Project,
and more than half of the successful participants do not change from
unemployed to employed during the course of treatment. This shift
results in part from a response to a changing job market and in part
from an effort to recruit low-risk defendants. In both instances the
change represents a major shift in the focus of such programs.
Two further trends in early diversion programs are probably related
to the euphoric initial evaluations. First, there is a temptation to stop
experimenting with program structures or missions soon after their
introduction into the criminal justice system. Once a program develops
a format and demonstrates its effectiveness to its sponsors' satisfaction,
the time for major innovation has passed. In this sense diversion projects
may become the sacred calves of the criminal justice system. All in all,
it is sad; we know so little, we do so badly, in this area of social control.
The second trend associated with early evaluation is, if anything,
more destructive than the premature ossification of such programs: the
first evaluations may have led proponents of diversion to misdefine the
proper goals of such programs. For example, our reevaluation of CEP
tended to show that when defendants are diverted from the ordinary
processes of the criminal justice system, they do no worse than those
who are fully processed through the police, courts, and correctional
systems in New York City. This result could be regarded as a sufficient
mandate for a program that seeks to inject humanity into a system that
is not known for either excessive humaneness or demonstrated effectiveness. The early studies finding dramatic reductions in rearrests, however, may have led supporters of diversion programs to expect far too
much from such reforms. At this writing, no correctional intervention
strategy short of capital punishment has reduced subsequent recidivism
by as much as one-half. The early matched group evaluations of diversion may force diversion proponents to demonstrate this type of impact
or be considered failures. If, however, such programs can achieve a
limited success in avoiding the stigma of criminal conviction and pro-
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viding offenders a second or third chance without disproportionate
community risk, they will have achieved more good than harm. It
would be sad indeed if early indications, based on defective analysis,
were to lead diversion programs unnecessarily to claim benefits not
essential to the case for their continuation.
CONCLUSION

Diversion programs, if designed and executed humanely, are probably a healthy reform in the present state of American criminal justice.
As a result of uninformed evaluation efforts, they are also oversold and
widely misconceived.
The only cure for a poor evaluation is a good one-in this case,
large-scale and careful random assignment experimentation, a procedure that may well be in process by the end of this year in New York.
Yet there is a larger issue lurking in the story of the Court Employment
Project. Program evaluation is presently a growth industry, but the quality controls on legal reform research are few. In the coming years the
job of empirical research in law reform is not that of achieving lip
service recognition but of demonstrating its value as a policy science.

